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While the statutory language of the federal law and state law,
involving search and seizure, is very similar. the courts have held
that both laws recognize "the basic constitutional principle that,
absent exigency or consent, searches and seizures within a home
without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable and a violation
of the... Fourth Amendment of the Constitution. 0

SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION
SECOND DEPARTMENT
People v. Hichez
(decided June 23, 1997)
The Appellate Division, Second Department, affirmed the
defendant's conviction of burglary in the second degree, grand
larceny in the third degree, criminal possession of stolen property
in the third degree and reckless endangerment in the second
degree but modified the sentencing of all charges 303 The
defendant, Abraham Hichez, contends that his arrest was in
violation of Payton v. New York,2w and therefore any evidence
exigency existed when a rape suspect asserted that he had another girl in the
room)).
206 Smith, 658 N.Y.S. at 262 (Tom, J., dissenting) (citing Payton, 445 U.S.
573, 586 (1980)).
2 659 N.Y.S.2d 488 (2d Dep't 1997).
2Id.
at 489.
2- 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
In Payton, defendants contended that the New
York statute allowing police officers to make a felony arrest inside a person's
home without a warrant and with force was in contradiction to the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution as applied to the states by the
Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 574. The revised statute, N.Y. CRIM. PROC.
LAW §§ 140.15(4), 120.80 (McKinney 1971) provides in pertinent part:
In order to effect such an arrest, a police officer may enter
premises in which he reasonably believes such a person to be
present, under the same circumstances and in the same
manner as would be authorized, by the provisions of
subdivisions four and five of section 120.80, if he were
attempting to make such arrest pursuant to a warrant of
arrest.
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obtained must be suppressed. 10 In addition, defendant contends
that there was error under People v. De George,21 when the
prosecution commented on the defendant's refusal to answer

questions concerning
2 12
interrogation.

a specific robbery

during a police

The Appellate Division, Second Department, affirmed the

County Court of Westchester County's conviction holding that
there was no violation under Payton because the defendant
consented to the police officer's entry. 23 The court further held
that there was error because of the prosecutor's comment on the
defendant's silence concerning a particular robbery. However,
"the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt" because of
the curative jury instruction and of minimal probative value when
weighed against the overwhelming evidence of the defendant's
guilt. 2 4 In addition, the court ordered that the sentences be
vacated with respect to grand larceny in the third degree and
criminal possession of stolen property in the third degree
because, as a matter of law, they were not violent felonies and
therefore should not have been sentenced as such. 25" Finally, as a
Id. The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or the things to be seized.
U.S.
CONST.
amend. IV.
21
0 Hichez, 659 N.Y.S.2d at 489.
21173 N.Y.2d 614, 541 N.E.2d 11,543 N.Y.S.2d 11(1989). InDe George,
the defendant claimed that the admission of his silence as impeachment and
direct evidence was in violation of the Federal and New York State
Constitutions. Id. at 618. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment
states in pertinent part that: "[N]or shall any person be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself.. . ." Id. N.Y. CONST. art. I,
§ 6. This section provides in pertinent part: "[N]or shall he be compelled in
any
criminal case to be a witness against himself...." Id.
21
2 Hichez, 659 N.Y.S.2d at 489.
213

Id.

214

Id.

215

Id.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol14/iss3/56

2

et al.: Search and Seizure

1998

SEARCH AND SEIZURE

1199

matter of discretion, the court held that the sentence of twentyfive years to life was too excessive and thus reduced it to
fifteen.

216

The arresting officer entered defendant's house to affect the
arrest without a warrant, however, the officer testified that the
entry was consensual.217 Furthermore, the prosecutor commented
to the jury that the defendant refused to answer questions when
the police questioned him about a specific robbery."' Finally,
defendant received a sentence for grand larceny in the third
degree and criminal possession of stolen property in the third
degree as if they
were violent felonies when as a matter of law
21 9
not.
are
they
The court reasoned that there was no Payton violation because
the hearing court gave credit to the arresting officer's testimony
that the entry was consensual. 22 In Payton, New York detectives
having probable cause to believe that Payton murdered a gas
station manager, entered defendant's apartment to affect an arrest
without a warrant. 221 After the officers heard music emanating
from the apartment and there was no response from knocks on the
Thirty minutes
metal door, they called for reinforcements.'
later the officers entered the apartment to find no one there,
however, in plain view was a .30 caliber shell that was later used
at trial against the defendant.2m Defendant claimed that the
warrantless entry was a violation of his constitutional rights under
the Fourth Amendment. 224
New York courts distinguish between seizures of the person
and seizures of property based on two different levels of

2 16

1d.

217 id.

218 1d.
2 19

22

Id.

Id.

221Payton

v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 577 (1980).

2mId.

= Id.

224

!d. at 574.
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intrusiveness.'
The Supreme Court disagreed with New York
by stating that any difference is "onel of degree rather than
kind" but agreed with the Second Circuit's 1978 position with
respect to the Fourth Amendment. 226 Moreover, the Court quoted
Judge Leventhal of the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia as saying, "greater burden is placed.., on
officials who enter a home or dwelling without consent. Freedom
from intrusion into the home or dwelling is the archetype of the
privacy protection secured by the Fourth Amendment. 11227
Because the hearing court found consent based on the officer's
testimony and that testimony was established on record, the
Hichez court did not disturb the holding of the lower court, 228

following the principles set forth in People v. Thomas.229
The Hichez court held that it was improper for the prosecutor to
comment on the defendant's silence when he was questioned by

police regarding a specific robbery.'

0

In People v. DeGeorge, 3

the defendant was convicted of assault and criminal use of a
2 Id. at 589. The two different levels of intrusiveness are exemplified by
the entrance into one's home for the purpose of arrest which is distasteful and
can be accomplished in public. Id. However, a search of ones home is more
intrusive into one's privacy which people expect not to be invaded by those
uninvited. Id. at 580 n.13.
26 Id. at 588-89. The court stated that:
To be arrested in the home involves not only the invasion
attendant to all arrests but also an invasion of the sanctity of
the home. This is simply too substantial an invasion to allow
without a warrant, at least in the absence of exigent
circumstances, even when it is accomplished under statutory
authority and when probable cause is clearly present.
Id. (quoting United States v. Reed, 572 F.2d 412,423 (D.C. Cir. 1978)).
27

Id. at 587.

2 People v. Hichez, 659 N.Y.S.2d 488, 489 (2d Dep't 1997).
29 People v. Thomas, 223 A.D.2d 612, 636 N.Y.S.2d 830 (2d Dep't 1996).
The court held that there was no merit in the defendant's contention because
the "hearing court's determination on issues of credibility should be accorded
great weight on appeal and should not be disturbed unless clearly unsupported
by the record." Id. Since there was probable cause and consent there was no
Payton violation. Id.
23 Hichez, 659 N.Y.S.2d at 489.
231 73 N.Y.2d 614, 541 N.E.2d 11, 543 N.Y.S.2d 11 (1989).
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firearm when, during a confrontation, he shot a man while inside

a bar. 2 During trial the jury heard evidence that the defendant
was silent immediately prior to his arrest, specifically when
officers asked general questions in his presence. 3
The
defendant's silence was used as direct evidence at trial to prove
depraved indifference.? In addition, it was used to impeach the
defendant's testimony on cross-examination."
The DeGeorge
court held that "absent circumstances not there present, our State
rules of evidence preclude the use of a defendant's pretrial silence
to impeach his trial testimony." 6 Although the use of pre-arrest
silence as evidence for impeachment is not a violation of the
United States Constitution, in situations such as this, the
DeGeorge court stated that the proffered evidence would have
minimum probative value. 7 In addition, the court reasoned that
in circumstances such as this, the defendant may have several
reasons to maintain silence."
Moreover, the court also
mentioned possibilities where silence as evidence would be more
probative than prejudicial, for example when there is a duty to
tell a superior? 9
Although the Hichez court found the use of the defendant's
silence by the prosecution to be error, it held that it was harmless
error beyond a reasonable doubt.2 ' The court relied on People v.
Wong24 ' where the defendant was convicted of first-degree rape,
first-degree robbery, attempted first-degree robbery, first-degree

232d. at

233 Id.
Z4 id.

616, 541 N.E.2d at 11, 543 N.Y.S.2d at 11.

235 Id.
236

Id. at 618, 541 N.E.2d at 13, 543 N.Y.S.2d at 13.

237 Id.

238 Id. Among the reasons for remaining silent are awareness of his right to
remain silent and that anything he says could be used at trial; defendant may
think his efforts would be moot or maybe an attorney has instructed him not to
speak, and it might be possible that the defendant has a mistrust of officers or
believe
law enforcement officers are antagonists. Id.
239 d. at 620, 541 N.E.2d
at 14, 543 N.Y.S.2d at 14.
2 People v. Hichez, 659 N.Y.S.2d
488-89 (2d Dep't 1997).
241201 A.D.2d 688, 607 N.Y.S.2d 977 (2d Dep't 1994).
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sodomy, and first-degree sexual abuse.242 Defendant claimed that

his Fifth Amendment privilege had been violated when the trial
court questioned him about his pretrial silence.2 3 The Wong
court held that it was error for the trial court to question the
defendant regarding his pretrial silence, however, it was harmless
because the court sustained defense counsel's objection by
appropriately instructing the jury to disregard it in consideration
of the overwhelming evidence of guilt. 244
In addition, the Hichez court further relied on People v.
Gluckowski,245 which held that although there was prosecutorial
error, the error was harmless.246 The Gluckowski court reasoned

that it is well established that a defendant has the right to remain
silent and the People cannot use that silence against him as direct
evidence under the Fifth Amendment as well as the New York
state constitution. 247
In Payton v. New York, 248 the Court recognized that it was not
until Mapp v. Ohio that the Fourth Amendment was made
applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. 249
Mapp prohibits police from making a routine felony arrest inside
a person's home without a warrant or consent."5° The Court in
Payton stated that "[ilt is a 'basic principle of the Fourth
Amendment law' that searches and seizures inside the home
without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable.""' The New
York statute that Payton invalidated, flew directly in the face of
242

Id.

243

id.

244
Id. at 690, 607 N.Y.S.2d at 978.

174 A.D.2d 752, 571 N.Y.S.2d 336 (2d Dep't 1991). In Gluckowski, the
defendant was convicted of second-degree manslaughter for stabbing his
girlfriend to death in his apartment. Id. Defendant claimed that the hearing
court erred by allowing the prosecutor to use his pre-arrest silence as evidence
against him. Id. Defendant remained silent as his mother divulged his guilt to
the246police officer prior to his arrest. Id.
Id.
at 754, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 338.
245

247

Id.

24 8445

249 Id,
250 Id.
21'Id.

U.S. 573 (1980).
at 576 (citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)).
at 586.
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that basic principle. 2 At the time of Payton's arrest, the Code of
Criminal Procedure allowed the police to forcibly enter a
person's home to affect a felony arrest without a warrant, consent
or exigent circumstances. 3 The Hichez court is inopposite from
the holding in Payton in that there was no violation because the
defendant consented to the entry of the officers.2M
With respect to the Fifth Amendment right to remain silent, the
Hichez court is again inopposite in its holding, as the New York
and the United States Constitution are parallel in meaning and
language . 55 The court found that even though the prosecutor's
comment was error, it 'was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt
and comported with the requirements of the Fifth Amendment
through jury instructions curing any prejudicial effects."
After the Payton decision, the New York courts' must accept
the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment
with respect to the warrant requirement when affecting an arrest
In addition, there is no substantial
within a suspect's home.'
difference between the New York State and federal law with
respect to prosecutorial error of the Fifth Amendment's right to
remain silent and the application of the harmless error doctrine.
People v. King 8
(decided October 6, 1997)
Defendant, Jermaine King, was convicted of two counts of rape
in the first degree, sodomy in the first degree and burglary in the
I Id. At the time of Payton's arrest, section 178 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure provided: "To make an arrest... the officer may break open an
outer or inner door or window of a building, if, after notice of his office and
purpose, he be refused admittance." Id. at 577 n. 6.
1 Id. at 577. The Code of Criminal Procedure was the precursor to New
York Criminal Procedure Law. Id. at 577-78.
1 People v. Hichez, 659 N.Y.S.2d 488-89 (2d Dep't 1997).
25 Id.
256 Id.

2 Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. at 602-03 (1980).
258232 A.D.2d 111, 663 N.Y.S.2d 610 (2d Dep't 1997).
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